Գլխավոր էջ International Journal Middle East Studies John Wright, Libya (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969). Pp. 280. Map. Bibilography. $7.50.Adrian...
Հայտնել խնդրի մասինThis book has a different problem? Report it to us
Check Yes if Check Yes if Check Yes if Check Yes if
you were able to open the file
the file contains a book (comics are also acceptable)
the content of the book is acceptable
Title, Author and Language of the file match the book description. Ignore other fields as they are secondary!
Check No if Check No if Check No if Check No if
- the file is damaged
- the file is DRM protected
- the file is not a book (e.g. executable, xls, html, xml)
- the file is an article
- the file is a book excerpt
- the file is a magazine
- the file is a test blank
- the file is a spam
you believe the content of the book is unacceptable and should be blocked
Title, Author or Language of the file do not match the book description. Ignore other fields.
Change your answer
222 Reviews to counteract similar efforts of the French in Persia. As stated in the proceedings of the mission,' In the year 1808, when from the embassy of General Gardanne to Persia, and other circumstances, it appeared as if the French intended to carry the war into Asia, it was thought expedient by the British Government in India to send a mission to the King of Caubul... As the court of Caubul was known to be haughty, and supposed to entertain a mean opinion of the European nations, it was determined that the mission should be in a style of great magnificence...' Elphinstone, accompanied by a staff of some fourteen British officers and a large native retinue, spent two years on the task of making 'such enquiries regarding the Kingdom of Caubul (which then included the present area of Afghanistan as well as Kashmir and the Punjab) as were likely to be useful to the British government'. Individual members of the mission were assigned to cover such areas as geography, climate, soil, husbandry; trade and revenue; history; government and the manners of the people. The result is an unusually comprehensive description of Afghanistan in the early nineteenth century, which should be of great interest to anyone in the field of Afghanistan studies. The volume is divided into five' books' - major chapters, which are again subdivided. Book I, gives a geographical summary of the area, describes the mountains, rivers, the natural and political divisions of the country, and the climate, flora and fauna and mineral resources. Book II, describes the inhabitants of the area, giving information as to the origin and history of the Afghans, government divisions, social customs, such as marriages, funerals, education, and religion. The traditional attitudes of the Afghans, their ' manners, customs, and character' are described and various classes of Afghans as well as ethnic groups in Afghan towns are discussed. Books III and IV give detailed accounts of individual tribes and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Book V, examines t; he government of Kabul, including the administrative, the military, and the religious establishments. Appendixes A-E present historical outlines of Afghanistan since the creation of the state in 1747 by Ahmad Shah. Kafiristan, Badakhshan, and Kashkar - places of which hardly the names were known in Europe at the time-are discussed in Appendix C. One item in the appendix is a Pashtu vocabulary of some 350 words. Elphinstone's book is a classic. It has been long out of print and the Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt must be congratulated for bringing out a beautiful reprint with color illustrations, maps, and an introductory note by Alfred Janata. LUDWIG W. ADAMEC University of Arizona Tucson, Arizona Libya (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969). Pp. 280. Map. Bibliography. $7.50. ADRIAN PELT, Libyan Independence and the United Nations, a Case of Planned Decolonization. Foreword by U Thant. Published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1970). Pp. xxviii + 888. Annexes. Index. Map. $35.00 JOHN WRIGHT, There have been fewer than a dozen scholarly studies about the history and society of Libya published since the appearance of Fuad Shukri's (Cairo, 1948) and E. E. EvansPritchard's (Oxford, 1949) works on the modern political history of the Sanusi Order. Reviews 223 The others, like these two, cover important but partial aspects of the history and politics of the peoples of Libya, concentrating on either Cyrenaica or Tripolitania (rarely on the Fezzan), on a limited historical period or on specific developments significant for all three regions. None of the existing studies attempt to build from available sources a general picture of the history of Libya that analyzes adequately relationships between the various parts of the country. Because modern writers tend to emphasize the separate development of the three regions, imposed by geography, the student of the Middle East and North Africa is left with only a vague impression that the history of this territory might yet be distinguished by some sort of unique ' Libyan' individuality. John Wright's book aims at presenting a general history of Libya without pretense at providing analytical insights into the dynamics of its history and society. What the book accomplishes is a general description of the highlights of Libyan history, summarized from a few relevant sources in English and Italian. The book fails to convey to the reader a sense of what is important in Libyan history or which political and social forces helped to make the country what it is today. Thus the book lacks proportion between its parts. The two Turkish periods of Libyan history - the 125 years rule of the Karamanh dynasty in Tripolitania (extending sometimes to Cyrenaica and Fezzan) and the development of the Sanusi Order in Cyrenaica - these three central foundations of modern Libyan history covering three and a half centuries, are dealt with summarily in twenty-six pages. Thirty years of colonial rule that had little direct impact on the society are given instead four chapters in sixty-six pages. This imbalance illustrates the fundamental weakness of the author's approach to his study. He treats his subject principally through the contours of external developments, paying scant attention to the history made by the indigenous population. To the author, the importance of much of the recent period, 1911-41, is the 'unique social experiment' of Italian demographic colonization rather than the Tripolitanian Republic of 1918 or the transformation of the Sanusiyah Order into a political kingdom under the leadership of Sayyid Idris to which he devotes sparse words in a few pages. The last five chapters dealing with the making of independence and the first ten years of statehood, a period with which the author is more familiar, are the better part of the book. Even here, however, there is undue emphasis on the development of the oil industry (not the implications of oil for the country's socio-economic development), which the author considers' of greater importance in the story of modern Libya.. .than the nation's political development since independence' (9). Finally, the book would have read better if provided with more and better documentation. It could have gained immeasurably if the author had referred to such essential works as those of Ettore Rossi (Rome, 1968), Enrico De Leone (Cagliari, i960), Micacchi (Rome, 1936), Mondaini (Rome, 1927), and Feraud (Paris, 1927). Despite a few inaccuracies, because of its general coverage this book is nevertheless a welcome addition to the literature on Libya as a useful introduction for the casual reader. Unlike other volumes in the series (Nations of the Modern World) it cannot be recommended as a serious reference to interested scholars. Adrian Pelt's volume is a basic contribution to the understanding of the recent political history of Libya. His is the most detailed, comprehensive, and revealing account to date of the genesis of the Libyan State under United Nations auspices. He writes with the experience of a long and distinguished career as an international civil servant and through his intimate involvement, as United Nations Commissioner, with the political unification and constitutional preparation of the country during the two years of transition to independence, provided for by the General Assembly Resolution 289 (IV) of 21 November 1949. Though the central theme of the book is about the coming together of the three 224 Reviews regions of the country to form a national community and an independent government, the author deals as thoroughly with two other equally important dimensions of Libyan independence closely related with nation-building in Libya and included in the title of the book. The first regards decolonization. In Libya, a former Italian colony administered after World War II by the occupying Powers, Britain and France, decolonization was a special case in which the principal issue was not one of defining post-colonial ties but rather of holding the strategic value of the territory in the Mediterranean in favor of the Administering Powers and their allies. The second dimension concerns the United Nations and Libya. The General Assembly played a unique role in resolving the Libyan Question over which the Big Four Powers were deadlocked but which they decided to refer to the United Nations (within the general question of all other former Italian colonies in Africa) for a recommendation that a priori they agreed to accept. The Resolution, and its acceptance by the Big Powers was a great achievement, apparently endowing the General Assembly with what one observer called at the time ' supreme legislative authority'.1 The successful implementation of the Resolution, for which the Commissioner and a United Nations Council were responsible in cooperation with the Administering Power, strengthened the UN's voice in matters of peace and security as well as in the vital area of peaceful decolonization of which Libya was perhaps the first instance. The book begins with a brief but useful historical background outlining the main political events in Libya since the Italian occupation of 1911. The first chapter is a frank and informative discussion of the contemporary internal and external factors affecting the unity and independence of Libya. The rest is a vast but well-organized detail of the conflicts and compromises arising within the UN (the Commissioner, the Council, the General Assembly) and within Libya (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Fezzan) and between the UN, the Administering Powers (and other interested parties) and the Libyans, as they dealt with the issues of decolonization and independence, nationbuilding and the UN's role in helping to solve them. Although the general outlines of Libyan independence are known from various sources,2 since the value of the book rests particularly in its richness of significant detail, I believe it is worth while to try to summarize the main contributions of Mr Pelt's 1,000-page study. Decolonization. Because of strategic considerations, the fate of Libya was closely linked with the nature of the post-War balance of power in the Mediterranean, i.e. to the status quo favoring the Allied Powers. Having failed to obtain approval of the General Assembly for a plan which would have partitioned the country between them (the socalled Bevin-Sforza Plan fell short by one vote of the required two-thirds majority), the Administering Powers agreed to the independence of Libya' for reasons of practical polities', but nevertheless intended to preserve considerable influence on its future. To this end, they adopted policies and practices designed to ' encourage the creation of three separate states (Cyreanaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan) which might, subsequently, if they could, form a union among themselves'. Failing this, but consistently aiming to control the forthcoming 'independence' of Libya, they attempted, through various steps, to dilute ' the concept and degree of Libyan unity' in the making, to such an extent, we are told, ' as to endanger the full implementation of Resolution 289 (IV) in 1 Benjamin Rivlin, The United Nations and The Italian Colonies (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: New York, 1950), p. 79. 2 See I. R. Khalidi, Constitutional Development in Libya (Khayat, Beirut, Lebanon, 1956) and Majid Khadduri, Modern Libya, A Study in Political Development (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1963): • • Reviews 225 letter and in spirit'. By combination of skillfully elaborated political and financial arrangements, the Administering Powers but especially the United Kingdom, though collaborating on behalf of the independence of Libya, manoeuvred itself into a position where it had substantial say in its political and economic life. Foremost among the political arrangements was the British-Sanusi informal alliance,1 cultivated in pre-War understandings and post-War agreements, which led to British proclamations (of 9 June and 16 September 1949), outside the framework of the UN proceedings on the Libyan Question, granting semi-independent status of Cyrenaica under the leadership of Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi. But for the energetic intervention of the Commissioner, this development threatened, the UN Resolution notwithstanding, to become formalized in a bilateral treaty providing full independence to Cyrenaica, separately, in return for the stationing of British troops there. Sustained by the convergence of important Sanusi and British interests, this approach was further pursued by the United Kingdom and France in parallel and later attempts to grant Tripolitania and the Fezzan extenshe local powers intended to strengthen provincial autonomy at the expense of the movement for unity. Indeed, even after the Libyans resolved the form of the federal structure to which they had agreed in principle and up to the moment of transferring sovereign powers to the Provisional Libyan Government, the Commissioner found that 'the administrative situation in Libya looked more like an exercise in decentralization than the realization of the General Assembly's wish to establish a united Libya'. The package of measures, underwritten particularly by the United Kingdom and designed to put the new nation on the road of economic and financial viability, was no less an effective instrument of control than direct political leverage. Acting on the federal level, British unilateral support for the Libyan budget (contrary to the wishes of the Commissioner for international assistance) meant in effect British budgetary controls. Yielding to pressures to join the Sterling Area and accepting development aid led by the U.K., with British ' advisers' placed in key positions in the government machinery, Libya found its new economic and financial existence strongly dependent on foreign will. This much-needed financial and economic 'aid' was, moreover, accorded in exchange for agreements with the Libyans to negotiate, after independence, the lease of military installations and facilities in the country for Britain, the United States and France. Therefore, the United Kingdom was anxious that the Provisional Federal Government become the Government of Libya on independence day so that the agreements could be negotiated and formalized between sovereign states but with the same Libyan team. In the political climate of 1950 this solution worked out for the Libyan Question appeared as a compromise scheme of ' decolonization' meant to ensure an effective and recognized sphere of influence for the most interested Power, allowing at the same time the independence recommended by the United Nations. The role of the United Nations. As it was formulated through 'manifold mutual concessions', Resolution 289 (IV) was bound to evoke various interpretations so that it is important to understand the concepts and operating criteria behind its implementation as the Commissioner saw them. Most fundamentally, Mr Pelt clarifies that the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies was referred to the General Assembly ' for a recommendation (not, as one might have expected, a decision) which the Four Powers had agreed not only to accept but also to put into effect. This meant that the implementation of Resolution 289 (IV).. ..was an obligation... But it did not mean that any part or parcel of their rights and duties had been surrendered to the United Nations of its Commissioner.' The General Assembly had appointed a Commissioner to cooperate with the Administering Powers and to ' consult and be guided' by a United 1 See Majid Khadduri, op. cit. p. 59. 226 Reviews Nations Council of ten members representing the major interests in the Libyan Question (including Egypt for the Arab bloc and Pakistan as a new nation) in carrying out the Resolution. Each of the United Nations organs was accountable directly to the General Assembly not to each other. The Commissioner, therefore, neither was the executive agent of the Council nor did he share responsibility with the Administering Powers or with their actions in the administration of the territory. His was the role of an adviser representing the assistance of the UN to the people of Libya' to draw up a Constitution and to set up an independent government'. The UN machinery implied some checks and balances within the Council and between the Council and the Administering Powers with the Commissioner acting as an independent intermediary and ' the central cogwheel in the movement'. How did this machinery function? The author narrates how differences between him and the Administering Powers were usually ironed out through compromise but that considerable friction characterized his relationship with the Council which tended to abuse of its powers in an attempt to control both the Administering Powers and the Commissioner himself. Their differences, which at times threatened to hamper the effective operation of the mission, arose at every phase of the proceedings regarding the Constitution and particularly the question of unity and the extent of federal vs. provincial powers. Much of the friction was due to the views held by the Egyptian, Pakistani and Tripolitanian members of the Council rejecting the compromise process being worked out and favoring instead a more nationalist and Unitarian approach to Libya's future independence. Despite these conflicts which slowed down the proceedings, especially since to the end Egypt and Pakistan also opposed the National Constituent Assembly of Libya, the Commissioner felt that it was well worth the time. The Council served not only as a direct regular contact for the Commissioner with the Libyan representatives, with the opposition and with the Administering Powers, but also as a sounding board to test his independent views. However imperfect the functioning of the UN machinery, its value can be measured not only against the extremely difficult issues of unity, decolonization and independence, but perhaps more importantly in consideration of the fact that without it, ' The three provinces, quite unconnected with one another, holding different views on their individual destinies as well as on their common destiny, would have been obliged to deal with two governments, exercising their powers through three different administrations, for the purpose of constituting a single, independent, and sovereign State.' Within its terms of reference and weaving through an intricate fabric of compromises to reconcile the various interests, the UN operation in Libya succeeded in carrying out its task within the time allotted. The Commissioner's role was particularly valuable in two critical aspects, containing the more flagrant aims of the Administering Powers to undermine the fragile attempts at Libyan unity and reconciling the Cyrenaicans and the Tripolitanian to begin negotiations not for ' territorial interests but as future planners of the State'. Under his leadership the mission was instrumental in helping to devise solutions to fine constitutional questions as well as to the overwhelming problems of resolving the type and method of representation of each territory in the two Libyan organs, the Preparatory Committee and the National Assembly, and of deciding the form of the State and its Constitution. To the Commissioner goes also the credit of looking at the long-term development of this emerging nation and calling international attention to urgent socio-economic and administrative needs, a question which the General Assembly failed to consider at the time leaving a critical gap to be filled by others. Finally the achievements of the mission in peacefully steering all parties through the actual transfer of powers to a' duly constituted 'Libyan government administratively capable of receiving and exercising sovereign powers, cannot be overstated. Reviews 227 Nation-building. Attempts at forging a nation out of the three regions of Libya have been made, during colonial rule, by the various leaders of Tripolitania (before, during and after the short-lived Tripolitanian Republic of 1918) and the Sanusi of Cyrenaica. These efforts were intensified after World War II, but as the author points out' although they had made considerable progress no mutually acceptable solution had been found. In the process the idea of unity had become increasingly associated with the concept of independence but the joining of the two had complicated rather than simplified the problems involved'. The internal situation in Libya was a paradox. The colonial experience and continuing external pressures made the Libyans realize the imperative of unity. Yet, the numerical inferiority of the Cyrenaicans and socio-ethnic differences with the Tripolitanians reinforced their separatist tendencies which were shaped by almost a century of independent existence as a stable community organized by the Sanusi Order. These were now spearheaded by the successful development of Sanusi domestic and foreign policies which were steadily supported, amidst the uncertainty of the international environment, by the United Kingdom. The strongest drive for Libyan unity was made by the politically fragmented Tripolitanians who, however, recognized that the Sanusi Head, being the only symbol of national unity, was the only possible leader acceptable to most Libyans and therefore the most important political element for attaining independence. This condition had to be reconciled with two equally strong desires: to become the dominant power in a new Libya that would, in their view, join with the Arab nationalist movement and above all not to accept subordination to the Sanusi dynasty which they had historically rejected. Hence the Tripolitanian posture, closely supported by the Arab League, favored unitarianism for Libya; while the Cyrenaicans, on the basis of their overall political strength, were reluctant to give up the ultimate safeguard of being able to go it alone if necessary, a choice which could be best guaranteed in a loose federal structure. Thus the Cyrenaican Prime Minister explained, as paraphrased by the Commissioner, that 'Cyrenaica had a right to the leading place when the independence of the country came to be considered. To assert this right, it had shaped the future for itself shortly before the UN decision on the Libyan Question was taken. That was why Cyrenaica was what it was, going its own way, maintaining its rights steadfast in its endeavors while still disposed to support the implementation of the UN Resolution... If the latter [the Tripolitanians] could overcome their few personal differences and move resolutely toward the country's revival in the direction of Cyrenaica, it would be possible to attach the Tripolitanian coaches to the Cyrenaican train...'. By the time of drafting the Constitution, the two conflicting concepts about the form of the State, though resolved in principle, continued to cripple the institutional application of the agreed upon federal union. The major lines of cleavage centered around the issues of equal representation and more acutely on the procedure of election of the constitutional organs. Although the details of this important political struggle cannot be even outlined here, its essence lies, according to the author, in the tenacious efforts and sometimes unscrupulous methods of the National Congress Party of Tripolitania, led by Bashir Al-Saadawi and supported by Egypt and Pakistan, to steer the constitutional process toward strong centralized government which it eventually hoped to control. Since the Congress Party felt it could hope to achieve its goal only by dominating the Tripolitanian membership of the National Assembly, its leaders first insisted on the appointment rather than election of the membership of the National Assembly, a procedure which the Cyrenaicans accepted for political expediency. However, when the selection prepared by the Tripolitanian representative on the Preparatory Committee did not produce a Congress Party list, Bashir al-Saadawi opted for elections claiming 228 Reviews that otherwise the Assembly would not be a representative body. This claim, acrimoniously debated in several forums and finally rejected by the UN General Assembly, led to profound repercussions: first, 'endangering the carefully worked out compromise among Libyans from all three territories'; secondly, undermining the Congress Party and discrediting it for a potential role as loyal opposition; and thirdly, by heightening the fear of Tripolitanian hegemony it strengthened the enemiesof unitarism. In light of the persistence of fundamental cleavages between the three territories on notions of government and community, it was inevitable that the Constitution should reflect a compromise balancing 'centralizing and decentralizing factors', with the particular monarchical system of Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi playing the central stabilizing role. For lack of space, three important features of Libyan constitution-making will be briefly mentioned. First, for reasons of functional viability of the State, both internally and internationally, the tendency was to make in practice for more centralization than expected under the federal principle. Secondly, the Constitution was being written against a deadline; many important issues were only partially debated or resolved because no Libyan wanted to cause postponement of the date of independence. Thirdly, at the insistence of the Cyrenaicans, amendment procedures were made rigid because they feared post-independence attempts to alter the basic terms of the union. Thus Independence Day foreshadowed the beginning of trial and much error and a constant challenge to maintain the momentum of unity against the pull of provincial particularism. Despite the sequentially ordered formal narrative based on extensive UN documentation, Mr Pelt's personal reminiscences and interviews with other living protagonists give the reader the full sense of the political struggle, sometimes the drama, surrounding the decisions taken and the alternatives considered in the process of guiding a former colony toward independence. Discussions of constitutional, legal and administrative matters are skillfully woven with underlying political or economic issues. In an effort toward objectivity, the author recounts his own role in the third person referring to himself as the Commissioner whose account can be treated as part of the historical documentation. However, the author explicitly avoids subjecting his work to a systematic analysis for fear that it might distort the reality he describes which is a product of pragmatic action motivated by compromise and political expediency. This is a big disappointment. Understandably, the author might have wished not to infringe on sensitivities of governments and individuals. Nevertheless, this consideration should not have prevented, twenty years after, a critical appraisal of events and information, to which he alone had almost unlimited access. As it is, Mr Pelt's description of Libya's ' peaceful transformation' to statehood does not help to resolve the controversial issues surrounding the subject nor does it conclusively argue for its own viewpoint. The central question that the role of the United Nations raises in the case of Libyan independence is whether the United Nations was able to transcend the pressures and compromises of power politics in order to protect the right of a former colony to self-determination and to uphold the basic principles of the Charter. There is sufficient evidence in the book to doubt that the UN successfully met this challenge. Mr Pelt concludes that' notwithstanding internal differences and external pressures about how they should do so, the fact remains that the Libyan peoples did freely exercise their right to self-determination' (p. 883). Yet this right was clearly subordinated to the interests of' peace and security' in the Mediterranean, as Mr Pelt recognizes: ' Indeed, the three principles underlying Resolution 289 (IV) - independence, unity, and selfdetermination regarding form of state and government - were meant not only to solve Libya's internal problems but even more [italics mine] to prevent a potentially dangerous Reviews 229 state of disagreement between the victorious allies from developing into a major international dispute' (p. 882). More explicitly, the author states in the Preface that he ' always kept in the back of his mind the fundamental fact that the purpose of the task entrusted to him was the establishment of a new balance of power in the interest of peace and that the creation of an independent and sovereign Libyan State had emerged from the General Assembly's deliberations as the only politically possible means to achieve that purpose' (xxii). The dominant factor in the independence of Libya was the alliance between Sayyid Idris, the most favored candidate for independence, and the British, representing the major outside interest in Libya. Together they had, in fact, produced a political formula promoting the interests of both and which the politically weak Tripolitanians had to accept as the political price of independence. The Commissioner had unwillingly become party of this formula when, in order to avert the above-mentioned Sanusi— British bilateral treaty for the independence of Cyrenaica, he had early in his mission (January/February 1950) reached, quite reluctantly, two key understandings with His Majesty's Government: (1) ' . . . that the provision of long-term facilities for the defense of the territory should be agreed upon at the same time as the final transfer of powers to the Libyan State after having been negotiated in draft form between the United Kingdom and the Provisional Libyan Government with the Commissioner's advice . . . ' , ( 2 ) ' . . . that a federal structure for the future Libyan State seemed to be in conformity with it physical conditions and political tendencies and that the Amir [al-Sanusi] appeared to be indicated as the probable head of such a State' (p. 169). As shown above, the outcome of the implementation of the Resolution closely reflected these understandings. The Commissioner believed, personally and not on UN authority, that the only solution for bankrupt Libya was ' to make money out of its strategic position' (p. 599), a concept strongly opposed by the Tripolitanians (pp. 598-9). In spite of his desire to protect the interests of the inexperienced Libyans in negotiating militaryfinancial treaties, in the end the agreements gave France and the United States important positions of special privilege, and to Great Britain a recognized sphere of influence (p. 830-4) the measure of which is revealed in the strict British observance of the maxim ' he who pays the piper calls the tune' (p. 705). In the face of continued strong opposition of the most important segment of the Tripolitanian political elite, the success of the British-Sanusi formula for the implementation of the Resolution cannot but give the impression that, contrary to the intention of multilateral decolonization (xvi) the 'strong' managed to control the 'weak' in Libya. As implied by the Commissioner (p. 434), Sayyid Idris was not a nationalist, the unity and independence of Libya having been constructed pretty much on his own terms. Clearly the Libyans' freedom to determine the shape of the political system had serious limitations which Mr Pelt underestimated then as he seems to do now, because he considered the nationalist viewpoint' unrealistic', especially since it was articulated by impractical' demagogues'. To the author, the fact that a Libyan National Assembly wrote the Constitution is the best proof that the Libyans freely exercised their right to self-determination. From a strictly formal-legal approach this conclusion is valid but it becomes much less tenable when one considers the political process which determined the form of the State and the Constitution. The Constitution was in fact nothing more than a hurried translation of political compromises, the most important of which were determined prior to the convocation of the National Assembly. Moreover there are serious formal-legal grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the National Assembly itself, since its Tripolitanian membership was selected by the Mufti of Tripolitania, the Chairman of the Tripolitanian delegation on the Preparatory Committee, who ' listened to its [British Adminis- 230 Reviews tration] advice and to some extent followed it' (p. 503, see also p. 297). The list was approved by only four out of seven members of the Tripblitanian delegation. More importantly, the National Assembly did not decide the form of the State. The choice had been formally predetermined (p. 290), contrary to the intentions of the Resolution, by the acceptance in the Preparatory Committee of the Cyrenaican proposal for a National Assembly based on equal representation. This was possible because the procedure of the Committee of 21 members, requiring a two-thirds majority and a quorum of 15 members, gave the Cyrenaicans and Fezzanis (whose combined population was half that of Tripolitania) a definite advantage over the Tripolitanians. Not surprisingly, ' the Committee's decision was a significant defeat for the advocates of a unitary State' (p. 302, footnote 58). Indeed, to produce a peaceful, independent Libya by the established deadline, despite persisting internal cleavages, despite a 'heavy psychological mortgage on its initial fund of freedom' (implied by economic dependence and aggravated by the future presence of foreign military bases in deference to security requirements in the Mediterranean) is an impressive achievement for the United Nations. But success on the plane of expediency should not be claimed as the triumph of the principles of the Charter. To my mind the Libyan case, and even the role of the National Assembly in it, provide little basis for the author's conclusion that' It should always be thus when the United Nations comes to the aid of new States' (p. 885). JACQUES ROUMANI Washington, D.C.